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CAVEAT EMPTOR: LESSONS FROM VOLKSWAGEN’S LEMON
PURCHASE
TERENCE J. LAU

INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1998, German automobile
manufacturer Volkswagen AG paid almost
$1 billion for Rolls Royce but did not
acquire the Rolls Royce trademark, which
was ultimately sold to rival BMW for a mere
$65 million. The story of Volkswagen’s
botched acquisition is a reminder of the
importance of careful due diligence when
engaged in international acquisitions.
In Part I of this Article, Volkswagen’s
steps (and mis-steps) are retraced and
solutions are offered for counsel engaged
in international transactions with the hope
that the practitioner with little experience
in this area can avoid similarly embarrassing
and costly errors.1
For many small to medium-sized
companies, the task of expanding
internationally is a daunting proposition.
In addition to the business equation,
the prospect of establishing a foreign
subsidiary or forming a joint venture with a
local partner is simply beyond the resource
capabilities of many domestic enterprises.
Licensing is therefore an affordable and
efficient way for companies to expand
overseas. Licensing comes in many
permutations and sizes but is essentially a
contract not to sue, by the licensor, as long
as certain conditions are met. In addition
to due diligence, therefore, international
corporate counsel should be aware of
unique contracting issues that arise in
international intellectual property licenses.
In Part II of this Article, recommendations
are offered on how to draft contract clauses
for international licensing use.
Finally, a discussion of licensing
technology that is U.S. origin would not
be complete without a brief discussion
of the U.S. export control regime counsel
should be aware of. Part III of this Article
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provides a brief introduction to that control
regime. Penalties for violations are stiff and
potentially ruinous, and enforcement is at an
all-time high due to security concerns. This
is information that all international counsel
should be aware of, not just experts in the
ﬁeld.

I. AN ACQUISITION GOES
AWRY – WHERE WERE
THE TRADEMARK LICENSE
ATTORNEYS?
Within a month,
Ere the salt of most unrighteous tears
Had left the ﬂushing in her galled eyes,
She married. O, most wicked speed, to post
With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!
-- Hamlet (1.2.153-157)2
When Will Shakespeare wrote Hamlet’s ﬁrst
soliloquy, he could not have foreseen a world
where his words would have signiﬁcance for
the breakup of one of the United Kingdom’s
most venerable companies, Rolls-Royce. Just
as Hamlet despaired over his uncle’s murder
of his father and his mother Gertrude’s
subsequent marriage to the murderous
3

Claudius, the news that Rolls-Royce (and its
sister Bentley) was being sold to German
automaker Volkswagen AG in 1998 and that
arch-rival BMW would own the trademark
to Rolls-Royce starting in 2003 was greeted
with derision and despair in Great Britain.
The end result, however, was far from preordained. Sloppy negotiating, abysmal due
diligence, and a rush to “get the deal done” led
to the incestuous relationship between BMW
and Volkswagen, and the “children” of that
relationship: Rolls-Royce and Bentley.
To understand the convoluted history of
the Rolls-Royce/Bentley saga, it is important
to trace the historical route the entities
involved took. Since 1904, when Henry
Royce met Charles Rolls,3 Rolls-Royce has
represented the very best in British motoring
and has set the world standard for vehicles
that catered to the ultra-rich. In 1931, RollsRoyce purchased Bentley,4 and, thus, began a
fruitful and prosperous relationship that saw
Rolls-Royce cater to the ultra high-end luxury
market while Bentley (which often were
Rolls-Royce vehicles thinly disguised, i.e., no
ﬂying lady, formally known as the “Sprit of
Ecstasy”) catered to the “sporty” end of the
same niche market. Meanwhile, during the
Second World War, Rolls-Royce focused its
attention on manufacturing aircraft engines,
a venture that continued successfully after
the war. In 1971, after ﬁnancial difﬁculties
with product development of a jet engine
designed for use on commercial airliners,
the entire company (then Rolls-Royce PLC)
went into receivership, and the vehicle
and aviation companies were separated.5
Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd., producing
both Rolls-Royce and Bentley vehicles, was
formed in 1973, and in 1980, was acquired by
defense manufacturer Vickers PLC. During
the 1971 receivership, however, Rolls-Royce
PLC maintained ownership of the “RollsRoyce” trademarks and licensed the use of
the mark to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. in
a 1973 trademark license agreement. One of
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the clauses in that agreement provided that
while Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. would
have the rights to manufacture Rolls-Royce
and Bentley motor vehicles, Rolls-Royce
PLC would maintain exclusive control of the
Rolls-Royce mark in the event Rolls-Royce
Motor Cars Ltd. (the licensee) was sold to a
foreign owner.6
By the late 1990’s, Rolls-Royce Motor
Cars Ltd. had run into ﬁnancial difﬁculties
and was having difﬁculty raising sufﬁcient
cash to invest in new product development.
The auto industry is notoriously unforgiving
in terms of capital expenditure and absent
high volume or high margins (preferably
both), cash to invest in future product
programs can be scarce. Meanwhile, Vickers
PLC, the motor company’s parent, was
interested in pursuing strategic growth in
marine, propulsion equipment, and turbine
components.7 Vickers, therefore, announced
the sale of Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. in
1997.
At ﬁrst blush, it may seem reasonable to a
buyer interested in the company to assume that
the corporate entity held all the assets required
to manufacture, distribute, and market RollsRoyce and Bentley motor vehicles. On
March 30, 1998, BMW announced a $560
million bid for Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd.8
BMW, then led by Bernd Pischetsrieder, had
a long history with Rolls-Royce, both the
aerospace engine company and the motor
vehicle company. As far back as the early
1990’s, BMW was supplying development
services on engine chassis/body rigidity,
paint technology, engine ancillaries, and air
conditioning to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd.9
In 1990, BMW and Rolls-Royce PLC (keep
in mind, a completely separate and unrelated
entity from the motor company) formed an
aero engine joint venture in Germany.10 At
the time the sale was announced, BMW was
supplying a V12 engine for Rolls-Royce’s
Silver Seraph model and a V8 engine for the
Bentley Arnage.11 An important detail in the
1994 engine supply agreement was BMW’s
right to cancel the supply of engines with
twelve months notice if Rolls-Royce Motor
Cars Ltd. was sold to another car company,
or three years notice if it was sold to a nonmotor vehicle manufacturer.12
A month later, led by Chairman Ferdinand
Piech, Volkswagen AG made an offer
for $720 million.13 In early July the offer
was increased to $795 million based on
newer ﬁnancial statements.14 The offer also
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included an ancillary deal to purchase Vickers’
Cosworth engines subsidiary for an additional
$190 million.15 On June 5, 1998, Vickers
shareholders agreed to the VW offer.16
It seems axiomatic that in an acquisition
worth many hundreds of millions of dollars,
trademark attorneys would have been
integrated into the due diligence process in
order to identify the nature of the trademark
property owned by the target company.
Arguably, in a company with storied past and
famous trademarks such as Rolls-Royce and
Bentley, the trademark is worth more than
the other assets purchased. It may also seem
obvious that the transactional attorneys would
review material supply agreements prior to
closing to ensure the target company could
continue operating its business as it normally
would while the new owner integrated the
target into its own processes, which for an
automobile company can take several years.
Alas, neither assumptions held true for
Volkswagen’s acquisition team.

The end result: Volkswagen had
paid almost $800 million for a
premium luxury car company
but did not have the right to
use its brand, had no engines,
plunging sales, and inherited
an ancient assembly plant and
cranky British workers.
What followed next was a tripartite punch
that surely takes the prize for spoiling an
acquirer’s post-transaction party. First, lawyers
for Rolls-Royce PLC notiﬁed Volkswagen of
the 1973 trademark license agreement and
ﬁrmly asserted its rights under the foreignownership clause to retain exclusive control
of the Rolls-Royce trademark.17 Second,
by July 9th, BMW delivered twelve-months
notice that it would stop delivering engines to
Rolls-Royce for the Silver Seraph and Bentley
Arnage models.18 Third, at around the same
time, BMW announced it had purchased the
Rolls-Royce trademark from its technology
and manufacturing partner Rolls-Royce PLC
for $65 million.19 One can only speculate
at the behind-the-scenes strategic meetings
occurring at BMW at this time. Led by
Pischetsrieder, the company had made a bid
for Rolls-Royce to allow it to grow into ultrapremium market segments, been outbid by
4

Volkswagen, realized (or knew all along)
the trademark was worth more than the
assets and was not part of what Vickers
PLC was selling, negotiated purchase of
the trademark from its rightful owner and
longtime partner (one has to wonder if
the sale of its aero engine joint venture
to Rolls Royce PLC in 2000 was part of
the negotiations), and then delivered the
death blow to Volkswagen by cutting off
supply of engines for critical products. The
end result: Volkswagen had paid almost
$800 million for a premium luxury car
company but did not have the right to use
its brand, had no engines, plunging sales,
and inherited an ancient assembly plant and
cranky British workers.
On July 28 that year, over a round of golf
at the Neuburg country club, Pischetsrieder
and Piech came to a compromise.
Under the terms of a Memorandum of
Understanding, Volkswagen would retain
the Bentley trademark, the factory in Crewe,
and its 2400 workers. BMW would own the
Rolls-Royce brand, but did not acquire
any factories, employees, or other assets.20
While BMW designed a new product and
built a factory in England (eventually built
in Goodwood), it would license the RollsRoyce brand to Volkswagen until January
1, 2003. It would also resume supply
of engines to Volkswagen to keep the
Rolls-Royce Silver Seraph in production.
Starting in 2003 (when its new factory was
ﬁnished, workers hired, and new product
(the “Phantom”) developed), BMW would
regain ownership and control of the RollsRoyce brand. Graham Morris, the chief
executive at Rolls-Royce Motors, who had
promised his staff that Bentley and RollsRoyce would never be split apart, resigned
as “a matter of honor.”21
For Volkswagen’s Piech, the settlement
with BMW was acknowledgement of a
costly and embarrassing error in business
judgment.22 During a press conference, he
admitted that he would “have liked to have
kept both brands” and that the purchase
price would have been “much lower” if he
had known it would not have included the
Rolls-Royce trademark.23
We may never know what led Volkswagen
to such a disastrous outcome. Any number
of personal and business factors may
have played a role, from Piech’s ego to a
lack of understanding of the nature of
BMW’s relationship with Rolls-Royce

Motor Cars Ltd.24 On the legal team’s part,
the transactional attorneys who assisted in
the deal must have been scratching their
collective heads over what went wrong.
Certainly, sloppy due diligence played a role.
Whether as a result of not discovering the
key trademark licensing agreement or simply
not reading all the documents gathered
during due diligence, a clearer understanding
of the nature of the trademark license held
by Rolls-Royce Motor Cars under the 1973
trademark license agreement with Rolls-Royce
PLC and the 1994 engine supply agreement
with BMW would almost certainly have saved
Volkswagen hundreds of millions of dollars.
Second, there is an important lesson here for
transactional attorneys who rely too heavily on
a seller’s representations and warranties rather
than on due diligence. While the purchase
agreement (whether stock or asset) between
Volkswagen AG and Vickers PLC no doubt
contained customary representations and
warranties on what Volkswagen was getting
for its $790 million, a long and protracted
court battle over Vickers PLC would almost
certainly have meant an interruption in
production of the Silver Seraph and Arnage
since a court battle would not have resolved
BMW’s termination of the engine supply
agreement. Rolls-Royce risked further
alienation of its loyal customers if there was
a further deterioration of its precious brand
image. Once the extent of the damage was
uncovered, therefore, Volkswagen had little
choice but to compromise with BMW and
salvage what it could from its $790 million
purchase. A tough way to learn the lesson
caveat emptor.25
There is an epilogue to the story between
the two executives most involved with
the acquisition, Pischetsrieder and Piech.
Pischetsrieder, in spite of his victory in
winning Rolls-Royce over Volkswagen, was
ﬁred a year later from BMW over his handling
of another (not quite as successful) BMW
acquisition, that of Rover (otherwise known
in the industry as “The English Patient”).26
Piech (who took a liking upon Pischetsrieder’s
negotiation and strategic skills that faithful day
in July on the golf course), upon hearing of
Pischetsrieder’s ouster, immediately offered
Pischetsrieder a job at Seat, Volkswagen’s
Spanish subsidiary. Within two years,
Pischetsrieder had taken over Piech’s job as
chief of Volkswagen, thus, inheriting the
newly christened Bentley Motor Cars Ltd.
(not to mention that old factory in Crewe

and its cranky workers).27 Looking back, he
says, “The best stories are written by life. To
a certain degree, I regret that I was so clever
to get Rolls-Royce back from Volkswagen, but
that’s the way it works.”28 With such dexterity
to incestuous sheets, indeed.
In spite of Volkswagen’s tale of horror,
many companies still find a tremendous
amount of value in licensing their intellectual
property across borders. For many U.S.
companies, licensing a product or technology
is the most cost efﬁcient and quickest way
to distribute a product into a foreign market
where it does not have any experience in
conducting business.29 The most common
concern these licensor companies face is
how to prevent the licensee from using
the intellectual property forever without
paying anything either by law, refusal by
local authorities to enforce the law, or just
because. The following contract provisions
may address some of these concerns, but
ultimately the ability of a licensor to prevent
the misappropriation or infringement of its
intellectual property in a foreign jurisdiction
is a vexing problem that may have no
satisfactory solution.

II. CONTRACT PROVISIONS TO
CONSIDER
Before considering licensing intellectual
property to a licensee in another country, an
initial question should be whether or not the
laws of the licensee’s jurisdiction provide the
same level of protection for the intellectual
property you are seeking to license as the
United States. While licenses are essentially
contracts, many jurisdictions lack the same
common law jurisprudence on contracts that
the United States enjoys, and thus, sanctity
of contract and the parties’ intent when
contracting may be overlooked.30 As a matter
of public policy, a foreign jurisdiction may
choose not to enforce a license agreement if
the subject matter licensed is not protected
under local law since in most jurisdictions
contracts contrary to public policy are void
ab initio.31 If the level of protection for the
subject intellectual property in the licensee’s
jurisdiction is nonexistent or insufﬁcient, then
contract drafting becomes even more critical,
particularly choice of law and forum clauses
in countries that recognize and enforce
foreign arbitration awards.32
In addition, clients should be counseled
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the law (and lawyers) can only do so
much to protect a company’s invaluable
intellectual property. No quantum of
damages or relief, equitable or legal,
could compensate the publication of the
formula of Coca-Cola on the Internet.
Clients who adopt too much of a “let the
lawyers protect us” attitude will expose
the company to unnecessary risk as they
ignore non-legal solutions to any potential
problems in protecting intellectual property.
Often, a licensee of technical information

. . . [T]here is an important
lesson here for transactional
attorneys who rely too heavily
on a seller’s representations
and warranties rather than
on due diligence.
has some other business relationship
with the licensor, such as seller or buyer.
Changes to the business relationship that
would result from a breach of the license
agreement will often have more persuasive
effect on a licensee’s compliance with
the terms and conditions of a license
agreement than the remedies provided
therein, and your business client is a critical
component in dimensioning that context
to the licensee.
The following are contract provisions to
consider while drafting a license agreement
for licensing intellectual property across
borders.
Deﬁnitions. Most license agreements
rely on the use of capitalized defined
terms, so the manner of definition is
critical. The most critical deﬁnition in
the license agreement is the definition
of the item or technology to be licensed.
The rights being licensed should also be
deﬁned in no uncertain terms.33 Carve
exclusions for derivatives, new designs, or
improvements of the item or technology.
On the other hand, if licensee improves
upon the licensed technology or item, the
agreement should address which party has
ownership of such improvements (i.e., a
grant-back clause).34 When deﬁning the
technical information to be used by the
licensee, an exception should be made
to exclude technical information that if
used by licensee would result in licensor
incurring an obligation to a third party or
CURRENTS WINTER 2004

breaching a conﬁdentiality obligation to a
third party.
Contract territory. One of the principal
worries in licensing intellectual property is if
something were to occur that would cause a
breach or leak of intellectual property within
a particular jurisdiction, that breach or leak
should be “contained” within the national
borders of the licensee’s jurisdiction. This
is especially true if the licensee is near or
contiguous to a major market for your client.
If the leak spills over into a high volume

. . . [A]n initial question should
be whether or not the laws
of the licensee’s jurisdiction
provide the same level of
protection for the intellectual
property you are seeking to
license as the United States.
market, the damage from the breach may be
much higher than if it is contained. A strong
deﬁnition of the contract territory is a good
place to start in this containment strategy.35
Within the scope of the license grant,
language should make it clear the licensee
has the right to use (and/or sell) the licensed
technology within the contract territory only.
Local counsel should be consulted to ensure
the enforceability of a no re-export provision
under a jurisdiction’s antitrust or competition
laws.36
Extent of licensed rights. Licenses can
run the gamut, from exclusive, royalty free,
worldwide, perpetual, fully transferable,
to non-exclusive, non-transferable, to use
a limited amount of IP in a very speciﬁc
territory, or for a limited time.37 If the license
is to be non-exclusive, a clause should be
inserted expressly reserving the right of the
licensor to use and sell the licensed technology
within the contract territory.38
If the license of intellectual property is
being granted to a joint venture company,
great care should be taken to control the ﬂow
of information to the joint venture itself and
not to the partner, especially if the partner is
a state owned company or afﬁliated with a
foreign government.
Obligation to support. If licensor will have
an obligation to support licensee’s use of the
licensed technology, issues to be addressed
include when such support may be invoked,
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expenses (i.e., hourly rate, level of employee
sent for support, business class airfare if
long distance travel is involved), and payment
terms.39
Registration requirements. Some foreign
jurisdictions require license agreements,
particularly those involving intellectual
property, to be registered with local authorities
in order to be enforceable.40 If legal, consider
a pro forma version of a license agreement
with the minimum amount of information
necessary to register if the client wishes to
keep other terms and conditions secret. If
the licensee is an afﬁliated company of the
licensor (i.e., technology holding companies),
care should be taken not to trip any non-use
statutes. Sometimes this problem can be
solved by registering agreements in foreign
jurisdictions.
Use restrictions. The licensor should clearly
deﬁne what uses the licensed technology may
be used for and exclude all non-defined
uses.41 In addition, the licensor should seek to
restrain transfer of the licensed technology in
all circumstances and may consider liquidated
damages in the event of such a transfer. Due
diligence is called for here. If a jurisdiction
does not permit restraints on transfers of
licensed intellectual property, the client may
wish to revisit the scope of the license granted
or negotiate a lower price for accepting a
higher risk of leakage.
Product labeling. If the licensee is permitted
to use the licensor’s trade name or trademark
under the license, the extent of use should
be clearly defined. Drafting should also
provide if the agreement is assigned under
any circumstances, the right to use such trade
name or trademark ceases immediately.
Payment terms. Payment terms, while
generally a business matter for the client
to negotiate, should be structured carefully
under applicable local laws.42 The parties
should specify what currency the fees will
be paid in and which conversion rate(s)
will apply.43 The frequency of payments,
level of accounting to be kept by licensee,
and the licensor’s right to audit should be
addressed. If licensor is to provide support
services during the term of the agreement,
those payment terms should be addressed as
well.44 Finally, consider whether the payment
structure raises any issues related to creating
a permanent establishment for tax purposes
in the licensee’s jurisdiction.45
Termination clauses. Careful consideration
should be given to how to terminate the
6

license, even if the term is a deﬁned length
of time.46 At-will termination is a knife
that can cut two ways and may be illegal
in some jurisdictions. If termination is
only permitted upon a material breach,
will there be an opportunity to cure, and if
so, how long will such opportunity last?47
The parties’ obligations upon termination,
no matter how the termination occurs,
should be addressed. At a minimum, the
licensed technology should be returned
and destroyed and cessation of use of
the licensed technology should occur
immediately upon termination. 48 The
license agreement must spell out that any
conﬁdentiality obligations that run with
the licensed technology shall survive any
termination for the agreed length of the
conﬁdentiality obligation.49 Bankruptcy or
insolvency of the licensee should give rise
to immediate termination by the licensor
without liability.50 Finally, consider a clause
similar to the one used by BMW in its 1994
engine supply agreement that permitted
BMW to make life unpleasant when
an acquisition or change or ownership
occurred.51 Do not forget to account for
changes in ownership that come about
either through stock purchase or asset
purchase.
Compliance with U.S. export controls.
While some licensees may raise questions
about this clause, it is critical as part of
your client’s export compliance efforts
that licensees are made aware of your
obligations with regards to controlled
technology or software.52
Conﬁdentiality clause. This clause is
essential. Consider limiting individual
persons and companies that will have access
to the licensed intellectual property (i.e.,
which employees and subcontractors). All
information exchanged with the licensee
should be deemed confidential unless
otherwise marked in writing or if disclosed
orally, is followed up with an exception in
writing. The duration of the conﬁdentiality
obligation should be identiﬁed,53 and the
clock should only start at the moment
of disclosure. Finally, the agreement
should protect for the licensor’s decision
to withhold information, without being in
breach of agreement, until satisﬁed with
licensee’s intellectual property secrecy
measures.54
Assignment. Licensor should reserve
the right to assign to afﬁliated company in

case of reorganization i.e., for tax purposes.
Licensee is generally not permitted to assign
for any reason to any entity.
Representations and Warranties. Licensee
may seek warranties about the intellectual
property being licensed, especially with
regards to potential infringement claims from
third parties.55 Licensor should seek to limit
the scope of these warranties.56 The strongest
warranty would be “Licensor’s activities do not
infringe on any third party’s rights.” A weaker
form of the same warranty would be “To
the best of Licensor’s knowledge, Licensors’
activities do not infringe on any third party’s
rights.” Finally, the weakest warranty would
be “Licensor has not received any written
notice that its activities infringe a third party’s
rights.” Especially in the area of software
development, the licensor should ensure it is
the rightful owner of any copyrighted works.
If the software was not created as work for
hire, for example, assignment of title needs
to be effected before licensor can license
the software. If licensee seeks warranties
on the registration of intellectual property
where registration is required, licensor should
limit the scope of the warranty to exclude
registrations “duly granted” or “valid” as they
assume additional undertakings beyond mere
registration. Both parties should also pay
close attention to the effect of exceptions to
any warranties that are disclosed on separate
schedules. These exceptions fall outside the
scope of the warranty being provided, and
the schedules are often not delivered until
signing of the license agreement is imminent,
when the business client is least likely to
want to re-open negotiations on the basis of
an unexpected exclusion to a warranty. Of
course, warranty language raises issues on
opinion letters and indemniﬁcation, which
are beyond the scope here.
Sublicenses. If the licensor will permit
sublicensing of the intellectual property to
second or third tier suppliers (i.e. suppliers
to the licensee), how will enforcement of the
license terms on such suppliers be effected?
Actions upon termination (i.e. destruction
and return of the intellectual property
and cessation of use) should run to these
sublicensees as well as the licensee.57
Taxes. The burden of paying income,
withholding, stamp, registration, turnover,
value added, and other charges should be
addressed.58 Be careful of undervaluing the
intellectual property for purposes of reducing
the taxable basis. Licensors should demand

licensee pay the licensor’s taxes and deliver
tax receipts and should address the issue of
offsetting taxes due with royalty or payments
due. Local counsel should be consulted on
the legality of shifting licensor’s tax burden
to licensee.59 Finally, licensors should seek
strong indemniﬁcation for tax claims against
licensor.
Choice of Law. Sometimes, in spite of
careful drafting and relationship management,
intellectual property may be compromised,
and a foreign jurisdiction may refuse to
protect what would otherwise be protected
under U.S. law.60 Under some circumstances,
a choice of law clause may be the saving
grace. If a jurisdiction enforces arbitration
clauses, getting the dispute into a friendly
arbitral forum that will recognize U.S. law
on intellectual property and then seeking
enforcement of any subsequent arbitral
award in a foreign jurisdiction may be
the ticket.61 Before deciding on a choice
of law clause, counsel should consider
what governing local law says about the
duration of license agreements, royalty rates,
ownership of intellectual property after
termination, government registrations or
approvals, export restrictions in the license,
trademark usage restrictions or requirements
in the license, obligation to provide future
improvements in the technology (incremental
vs. breakthrough), and withholding taxes on
royalties (who is obligated to pay and what if
licensee withholds and doesn’t pay). Some
jurisdictions will ignore choice of law and
apply local licensing laws, in which case a
clause on conﬂicts of law may be helpful.62
Arbitration. Depending on the licensee’s
jurisdiction, arbitration may be a necessity
in the event of a dispute.63 Counsel should
advise clients, however, that choice of law
and forum clauses only bind the original
licensee. If the licensed intellectual property
is compromised to non-parties, licensor will
have to rely on national law enforcement
for protection of its intellectual property
rights – not an attractive proposition in some
jurisdictions.
No agency, dealership, or franchise. This
clause is important in order to prevent a foreign
jurisdiction from imposing onerous agency
protection statutes upon the licensor.
Non-compete clause. As part of the license
grant, the client may wish for business reasons
to consider a non-compete clause to bind
the licensee for the license term. Be sure to
check with local counsel on the enforceability
7

thereof.
Severability, integration, nonwaiver of
remedies, amendments. These “boilerplate”
clauses, while taken for granted in the U.S.,
may provide important protections for the
licensor, especially in jurisdictions where
both business practices and local law
reﬂect a different approach to business
negotiations than American mores.
Language. Finally, the license agreement
should provide for which language of
the license agreement should control
interpretation in the event translations are
made.64 The agreement should also address
what language technical information and
licensed technology will be made in as well
as the language of correspondence and
notices among the parties.
In addition to careful drafting of licensing
agreements to account for local variances
in law and practice, counsel should also
give careful consideration to the effects of
U.S. laws on the technology to be exported
as well as the destination of certain
exports. The following section provides
an overview of these laws, many of which
have extraterritorial application and may
apply to non-U.S. entities.
A Licensing Alternative. If a license
agreement is essentially a covenant not
to sue, an interesting alternative to a
license agreement may be appropriate
in certain limited circumstances. This
alternative involves relying solely on the
law of contracts to protect the intellectual
property owner’s rights, sidestepping local
laws (i.e., on withholding taxes, registration,
ownership, and alienability rights) on
license agreements altogether. Such an
alternative is most appropriately found in
a global franchise or sales and distribution
agreement, and is most appropriate when
there are a large number of agreements to
enter into, in multiple jurisdictions.
Sample language in this license alternative
may include:
“The Distributor shall not contest the right of the
[Principal] to the exclusive use of any trademark
or trade name used or claimed by the [Principal],
and upon written request of the [Principal], the
Distributor shall immediately cease or modify, as
requested by the [Principal], any use or infringement
by the Distributor of any such trademark or trade
name. The Distributor shall not have or acquire,
either by usage, custom or operation of law, any
right to [Principal’s] trademark, trade name, coined
word, or combination.”

Caution is advised, however. Such
contract language, while serving to put
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the distributor or agent on notice about
the intellectual property owner’s rights,
may not hold up to scrutiny under analysis
by a local court if it is deemed to evade
(and possibly violate) local laws relating to
license agreements. It can also invite many
questions, as it is unfamiliar to most foreign
practitioners, even those who practice
intellectual property licensing. Nonetheless,
such contract language may ﬁt the bill for the
narrow purposes described above.

III. EXPORT CONTROLS: BIS,
OAC, OFAC AND DTDC65
Most exports out of the United States,
including exports of technolog y and
intellectual property via licensing, do not
require any sort of speciﬁc approval from the
U.S. government.66 Exporting, however, is a
privilege, not a right, and what the government
giveth, the government can taketh away.
Before the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the U.S. export control regime was
treated by most attorneys as a wayward child.
It was something to keep in mind, but not
something to be overly concerned about.
That child has grown up now, and it demands
the full attention of all counsel involved in
cross-border transactions, including (and
in some cases, especially) international
intellectual property licensing. Increased
enforcement vigor by a U.S. government with
a laser-focus on national security means that
U.S. companies must continue to pay extreme
heed to export controls and trade sanctions
for the foreseeable future.67
From a legal perspective, the U.S. export
control regime is fairly complicated but
not indecipherable. Interpretation of gray
areas within the rules (and there are many)
often will result in the most conservative
interpretation possible by government
agencies (especially when asked to put it in
writing), a result that would almost certainly
grind a signiﬁcant amount of commerce to
a halt. On the other hand, an overly cavalier
attitude towards the regime will almost
certainly deliver consequences of the most
unpleasant variety – negative publicity, heavy
ﬁnes, and the possibility of prison sentences.
With practice, most attorneys can become
skilled at navigating the various statutes,
regulations, and agencies that administer and
enforce the regimes. Counsel who do not
practice in this area on a regular basis are
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advised to seek counsel who are well versed
and well practiced, however, as the nuances
and subtleties in agencies’ interpretation
of the applicable law can change with the
political winds. This section will deliver an
introductory overview of the most important
export control laws which all intellectual
property counsel should be familiar with.
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
(“OFAC”)68

The Treasur y Department’s OFAC
administers trade sanctions and embargoes
against particular countries and entities.
Currently, countries subject to economic
sanctions include the Balkans, Burma
(Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 69
Per mitted activities differ under each
country’s sanctions regime and range from
a “soft” embargo (i.e. Liberia, where the
sanctions regime seeks to limit imports of
rough diamonds into the United States70 and
Zimbabwe, which seeks mainly to prevent
President Robert Mugabe and his family
and senior ofﬁcers from entering the United
States)71 to a complete trade embargo (i.e.
Cuba)72. Special care should be taken with the
Cuban regime sanction (based on the Trading
With the Enemy Act), which expressly applies
to foreign subsidiaries and branches of U.S.
companies, wherever located,73 and includes a
travel ban to Cuba.74 Special attention should
be paid to Trading With the Enemy Act-based

Exporting . . . is a privilege,
not a right, and what the
government giveth, the
government can taketh away.
sanctions programs (which apply to the
Cuban, North Korean, and certain portions
of the Iranian sanctions programs) due to the
heavy penalties associated with violations.75
The sanctions regimes administered by OFAC
are made even more confusing by recent
actions relaxing the export of agricultural
and in some instances, medical products
to sanctioned countries. These exports are
tightly regulated and prior approval by OFAC
is necessary. “Blocking” legislation designed
to prevent the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law
on foreign-incorporated entities may create
an uncomfortable situation for a foreign
subsidiary faced with the choice of disobeying
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U.S. or local law. Other sanctions regimes,
while not directly applicable to foreignincorporated subsidiaries of U.S. companies
(they still apply to foreign branches of U.S.
companies and U.S. citizens everywhere),
prevent the “approval” or “facilitation”
of prohibited transactions by U.S. parent
companies and U.S. employees. OFAC
takes an extremely broad application of
these words – caution is strongly advised.
OFAC also maintains sanctions against
entities deemed to be hostile to U.S.
interests. Currently, these regimes’ targets
include narcotic trafﬁckers, the Taliban,
terrorists, and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. OFAC also maintains a
list of “Specially Designated Nationals”
and “blocked persons” that persons and
entities subject to OFAC jurisdiction must
not deal with and block assets of.76 The
list of governments, companies, persons
and organizations that are off-limits to
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction changes
constantly, and companies of all sizes
involved in trading activities must maintain
strong compliance programs including the
use of automated screening software.77
As many of these entities are based in the
United States, even companies that conduct
business exclusively in the United States
should be checking their customers against
OFAC’s lists.78
OFAC maintains a compliance hotline
that allows companies and individuals
with questions to speak with a compliance
ofﬁcer. Calls are ostensibly handled on
a conﬁdential basis. Counsel is advised,
however, to either block caller identiﬁcation
systems or to seek information via outside
counsel, in order to maintain complete
confidentiality and the privilege. In
addition, do not expect OFAC compliance
ofﬁcers to interpret the law more clearly
than what is already publicly available.
One OFAC spokesman, when asked how
ﬁnes were determined in a case involving
the importation of Cuban cigars in 2000,
unhelpfully replied, “There are a variety of
ways to determine the ﬁne.”79 In another
case, job search assistance website Monster.
com decided it had to scrub mention of
OFAC-sanctioned countries from all its
online resumes, resulting in charges of
discrimination from Americans of Iranian
descent.80 OFAC, while claiming it did
not ask Monster.com to make the move,
insisted that the company had interpreted

the law correctly.81 Most compliance ofﬁcers
will answer questions broadly, err on the
side of conservative interpretation, and
recommend the ﬁling of a license application
to obtain a deﬁnitive answer.
Counsel are often asked by clients to predict
when sanctions against a particular country
may be lifted. Such tea-leaf reading is a
dangerous task when it comes to sanctions
on regimes for the political winds can
shift suddenly. For example, the Burmese
sanctions regime prohibited, for a long time,
new investment in Burma while permitting
exports and imports.82 After the arrest of

Counsel are often asked
by clients to predict when
sanctions against a particular
country may be lifted. Such
tea-leaf reading is a dangerous
task . . .
Nobel Peace Prize winner and winner of
the last democratic election Aung Sung Suu
Kyi, the United States tightened the sanctions
noose around Burma with Congressional
passage of the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 on July 23, 2003, and
an Executive Order the next day, prohibiting
the import of any “product of Burma” and
the export of ﬁnancial services to Burma.83
A ﬁnal word of caution, OFAC has recently
announced a rule that would make disclosures
of identities of companies that have settled
allegations of violations of the sanctions
regimes.84 These disclosures occur even if a
company voluntarily disclosed an inadvertent
violation (most often this occurs when a
foreign subsidiary, without malicious intent,
engages in some form of prohibited conduct
or when a U.S. parent company provides some
form of support or facilitation to such foreign
afﬁliate) and even if a company denies any
wrongdoing and has not been adjudicated
responsible in any administrative tribunal or
court. This rule is fresh out of the comment
phase,85 and OFAC has started publishing
the identities of alleged violators.86 Public
recriminations against the companies involved
quickly followed.87
BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY
(“BIS”)

The BIS 88 administers the Expor t

Administration Regulations (“EAR”),89 which
control the export of dual-use items (dual-use
items are those that have both military and
commercial applications). Every export out
of the United States is potentially subject
to the EAR. Additionally, exports from
countries other than the United States are
subject to the EAR if they are re-exports of
U.S.-origin commodities and technical data,
contain U.S.-origin parts and components
used in the manufacture of a foreign endproduct (subject to de minimis exceptions),
non-U.S. produced direct products that
result from U.S.-origin technical data, or
commodities produced by a plant or major
component of a plant located outside the
United States that is the direct product of
U.S.-origin technology or software.90 Analysis
under the EAR typically asks ﬁve questions:
(1) What are you exporting? (2) Where is it
going? (3) Who is the ultimate end-user? (4)
What is the ultimate end use of the product?
and (5) What else does your end-user do, such
as contracting or ﬁnancing?91 Depending
on the answers to these questions, an export
license may be required before shipment.
Additionally, information from the EAR
is usually required to complete a Shipper’s
Export Declaration (“SED”).92
One area of particular concern surrounds
that of “deemed exports.” Under the
“deemed export” rule, an export can occur
within the borders of the United States if
covered technology or source code is released
to a covered foreign national (i.e., a tourist,
student, employee, or academic). Care should
be taken in any licensing arrangement to
ensure the burden of compliance with the
EAR (including the deemed export rule) is
clearly spelled out. Last year, BIS commenced
the ﬁrst criminal prosecution based on the
deemed export rule by seeking indictment of
two California companies and their presidents
for “exporting” controlled technology to
Chinese nationals in the U.S.93
OFFICE OF ANTIBOYCOTT COMPLIANCE
(“OAC”)

Anyone doing business (not merely
exporting, but conducting all aspects of
business including negotiations) with persons
or entities in the Middle East needs to be
mindful of U.S. antiboycott laws. The OAC,
actually a division of BIS, administers the
antiboycott provisions of the EAR94, while
the Internal Revenue Service administers
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the antiboycott provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Both laws seek to prohibit
U.S. companies from complying with the
Arab League boycott of Israel.95
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE
CONTROLS96

The Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls (formerly Office of Defense
Trade Controls, or OTDC) administers the
International Trafﬁc in Arms Regulations
(“ITAR”).97 The ITAR seeks to control the
export of defense articles and services, as
listed on the United States Munitions List
(“USML”).98 Companies which seek to
export or re-export items on the USML
must obtain prior permission from the
DDTC. Additionally, licenses must be
obtained before importing, even on a
temporary basis, certain items. Companies
wishing to apply for a license must ﬁrst
register with the OTDC. Registration is
a simple process, but must be undertaken
on a regular basis in order to prevent
registrations from lapsing.
Special care and attention should
be paid by companies seeking to enter
into license agreements to provide a
defense service. Such agreements may
include manufacturing license agreements,
technical license agreements, distribution
agreements, or off-shore procurement
agreements. These agreements may not
enter into force without approval from
DDTC and must be deposited with DDTC.
In addition, the agreements must contain
a certain level of information including
statutorily-prescribed clauses.99

CONCLUSION
By and large, negotiating and drafting
international intellectual property licenses
is an enjoyable practice for most attorneys.
Unlike joint ventures or distributorships,
these licensing arrangements almost always
involve a “win-win” business relationship
between licensor and licensee. While
horror stories can be found especially in the
area of licensing in a merger or acquisition
context or complying with the U.S. export
control regime, careful attention to drafting,
due diligence, and legal compliance will
go a long way to mitigate those risks and
concerns and keep the ghost of Hamlet’s
father away for a very long time.
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